Politics, Business & Culture in the Americas

Trump Always Wanted Tariffs on Mexico

Mexico’s efforts to appease the White House through cooperation may have been doomed from the start, writes AQ’s editor-in-chief.
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks in the White House on March 3.Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images
Reading Time: 3 minutes

A clear sign of the impending transformation of U.S.-Mexico ties came a week ago in an interview with Donald Trump’s special envoy to Latin America, Mauricio Claver-Carone. Speaking to CNN en Español, Claver-Carone piled praise on President Claudia Sheinbaum and her “extraordinary” efforts to control immigration.

“She has shown herself to be a great leader,” Claver-Carone enthused, comparing her favorably to her predecessor Andrés Manuel López Obrador. He lauded Sheinbaum’s security team, and the sharp decline in border crossings since Trump took office. “I think what President Sheinbaum knows and understands … is that with migration controlled, and an appropriate security policy, Mexico could be a much more successful country.”

The interviewer then asked the obvious question: If cooperation has been so good, wouldn’t it be a mistake to pass 25% tariffs, which most economists agree would damage both countries?

“They’re wrong,” Claver-Carone replied, saying those same economists “pushed the first free trade deal between the United States and Mexico which basically emptied out and caused a terrible economic outlook for half of the United States.” He added: “There is no reason or right for the United States to be the only country that the world can export to free of any tax.”   

For many observers in Mexico and elsewhere, this was proof of the dreaded concept of “delinkage”—the idea that no matter how thoroughly Sheinbaum cooperated on bilateral issues, the Trump administration was determined to press ahead with major tariffs anyway. And indeed, at midnight Tuesday, even after a week in which Mexico agreed to extradite 29 drug cartel leaders, and the U.S. Border Patrol announced migration and fentanyl seizures had declined to multi-year lows, the White House implemented 25% tariffs on both its southern and northern neighbors. 

The official reason given was fentanyl flows. But a statement issued on the same day as the new tariffs by Trump’s Office of the U.S. Trade Representative pointed to a much broader logic. It called U.S. manufacturing job losses over the last 30 years “the product of a withering, decades-long assault by globalist elites who have pursued policies—including trade policies—with the aim of enriching themselves at the expense of the working people of the United States. As a result, the middle class has atrophied, and our national security is at the mercy of fragile international supply chains.” 

That sounds like a White House committed to a wholesale reorganization of the United States’ trading relationships. While it’s true this administration has rival power centers, and often seems to radically change tack with little advance notice (take Venezuela policy), this is one objective they are likely to accomplish. Even if tariffs on Mexico and Canada are lifted or lowered within a few days or weeks, confidence in the idea of an integrated North American supply chain has now been forever damaged, if not shattered. It is difficult to imagine most companies making significant investments in an economic matrix that can be plunged into existential doubt at any given moment.

Indeed, that seems like the point. The idea commonly heard on Wall Street that tariffs were simply leverage for negotiations was always highly dubious. While Trump has been both a Republican and a Democrat over the years, his focus on trade deficits has been consistent since the 1980s, when he proposed a 15%-20% tariff on imports from Japan, the ascendant power of that era, arguing “America is being ripped off.” In more recent years, Trump’s through line has been Mexico—he began his 2016 campaign by accusing the country of sending its worst citizens to the United States and stealing U.S. manufacturing jobs, messages he repeated ad nauseum throughout the 2024 campaign as well. If a more fundamental split was averted during Trump’s first term, it was because of moderate figures in his orbit like Jared Kushner or John Kelly, and the president’s need to be reelected—both now gone. The U.S. trade deficit with Mexico hit a record $172 billion in 2024, up 55% from the last year of Trump’s first term, adding further fuel to the fire.

Where do we go from here? Sheinbaum reacted calmly, as always, in her Tuesday morning press conference—“Cool heads,” she urged—saying she would announce measures on Sunday if the tariffs were still in place, but leaving the door open for a deal. Momentum for rollback may also build on the U.S. side of the border, especially if markets continue to slide and Republican governors like Texas’ Greg Abbott, whose state does more than $270 billion in trade with Mexico annually, begin to cautiously voice concerns. But talking to officials and business figures from both countries, I sense a feeling that a threshold has been crossed, and there is no going back to the way things were over the last 30 years. In some corners, especially within the Trump administration, that is a cause for celebration.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Brian Winter

Reading Time: 3 minutesWinter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and a seasoned analyst of Latin American politics, with more than 20 years following the region’s ups and downs.

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Tags: Mexico, tariffs, Trump
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Any opinions expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of Americas Quarterly or its publishers.
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