Politics, Business & Culture in the Americas

Bolsonaro and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

The former president’s possible arrest would reshape the electoral process into a broader political conflict, challenging the right.
Former President Jair Bolsonaro speaks during a Liberal Party's seminar in Brasilia on February 2025. (Photo by Evaristo Evaristo Sa/AFP via Getty Images)
Reading Time: 4 minutes

RIO DE JANEIRO — The announcement from the Brazilian attorney general’s office that former President Jair Bolsonaro and 33 others, including seven retired Army generals, will face charges for plotting and attempting a coup d’état marks the start of Brazil’s 2026 presidential campaign.

Even many loyal supporters believe Bolsonaro, the country’s most popular right-wing leader of the 21st century, is likely to be found guilty by the Supreme Court, which could bring a sentence of up to 43 years in prison. While the exact timing of a potential conviction and sentencing is unclear, most expect the matter to be resolved by April of next year, which would give opposition leaders enough time to select another candidate to challenge the incumbent party, whether its candidate is President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva or someone else. With Lula experiencing the worst approval ratings of any of his three terms in office, this could be the ideal moment for the Brazilian right to unite all those opposed to his Worker’s Party, or PT.

Bolsonaro, however, does not operate by that kind of political logic. He appears to be thinking of himself and his future first, second, and third. And because of that, as of today, he’s holding the opposition in suspense.

Attorney General Paulo Gonet’s 272-page report accuses Bolsonaro of many things, starting with spreading misinformation about the electoral system ahead of the 2022 election. According to the report, after losing to Lula, Bolsonaro allegedly sought military support to overturn the results, urging the Armed Forces to find evidence of fraud, accept a martial law decree to arrest opponents, and call for new elections. (Bolsonaro has denied any illegal actions, arguing the case is politically motivated.)

The report alleges that then-Navy Chief Admiral Almir Garnier Santos supported the coup, while Army and Air Force commanders refused to participate. Lacking support from active-duty officers, the report says Bolsonaro turned to retired generals who then allegedly planned the assassination of Lula, his running mate Geraldo Alckmin, and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. Another parallel plan aimed to incite chaos through mass protests, which would require a military intervention. The first part of that did happen during the January 8, 2023, attack on government buildings—Brazil’s version of the U.S. Capitol riot. Lula, however, solved the Brasília riots without asking the military to intervene.

A defense strategy in the streets

Brazil’s Supreme Court has already convicted 317 people involved in the attack, while 527 reached plea deals. Bolsonaro’s defense acknowledges that military officers and Cabinet members conspired but denies his direct involvement, arguing he had no control over events since he left Brazil on December 29, 2022. His legal team plans to challenge the trial’s proceedings to delay its start.

Bolsonaro’s legal defense strategy may appear frail, but it’s combined with coordinated efforts on two other fronts in which bolsonarismo works well: on the streets and in Congress. On March 16, a rally will be organized under the pretext of asking for amnesty for those sentenced by the January 8 attacks. However, that demonstration will end up serving as an act of popular support for Bolsonaro, and it will be vital to measure Bolsonaro’s ability to mobilize his followers.

In Congress, the pro-Bolsonaro caucus is trying to push two draft bills: one that grants amnesty to those sentenced due to the January 8 attacks—which theoretically would also help Bolsonaro and those accused of coup-plotting—and another that alters the prescribed punishments for electoral crimes. In a separate case in 2023, Bolsonaro was sentenced to eight years of political ineligibility, which effectively removes him from next year’s presidential race.

Finally, Bolsonaro is seeking attention from the Trump administration to apply pressure on Brazilian courts. There is limited room to influence judicial decisions. However, he and his supporters depend on Trump and Elon Musk as international champions for their unfounded claims that Brazil is under a left-wing dictatorship. Musk’s X and Trump’s Rumble have frequently clashed with the Brazilian judiciary over free speech rights for radical movements in the country.

The opposition’s crossroads

The combined efforts of legal maneuvers to delay the trial, street protests, congressional tactics, and international campaigning make it clear that Bolsonaro will not back down without a fight. While avoiding incarceration seems very difficult, Bolsonaro is determined to remain at the center of the political stage and turn the electoral process into a broader political battle.

Ironically, that was the same strategy employed by Lula in 2018 when he was convicted and arrested on corruption charges yet sustained his presidential candidacy until three weeks before the elections. Lula’s determination to fight did not prevent his arrest nor Bolsonaro’s victory in 2018, but it was crucial for maintaining his leadership within the left and helped him re-enter the political arena in 2022. Bolsonaro has already suggested that if he cannot run himself, he will endorse one of his sons, either Congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro from São Paulo or Senator Flávio Bolsonaro from Rio de Janeiro.

This opposition might benefit Jair Bolsonaro but could also result in the right losing the 2026 election. Both the political and financial establishments want São Paulo Governor Tarcísio Gomes de Freitas to run as the sole opposition candidate. To run for president, Freitas would need to resign from his gubernatorial office, which he would only do if he had Bolsonaro’s full support. In the opposition’s ideal scenario, Bolsonaro would be convicted and arrested this year, announcing his support for Freitas in exchange for a presidential pardon if the candidate wins. As of now, that seems highly unlikely.

In summary, Brazil’s right may face a classic prisoner’s dilemma: the notion from game theory that illustrates a situation where individuals make suboptimal decisions that act against their best interests. Without Tarcísio de Freitas as the presidential candidate, the opposition will likely divide. In addition to one of Bolsonaro’s sons, the governors of Minas Gerais, Romeu Zema, and Goiás, Ronaldo Caiado, are expected to run, along with outside figures like the online coach Pablo Marçal or country music singer Gusttavo Lima. A fragmented opposition would test whether Bolsonaro has sufficient political weight to propel one of his sons into the run-off, while also making Lula’s path considerably easier.

The opposition faces a dilemma: it cannot win without Bolsonaro’s votes, yet clinging to his agenda could spell its downfall. Meanwhile, with approval ratings under pressure, President Lula’s best shot at reelection ironically hinges on Bolsonaro’s strategy.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Thomas Traumann

Reading Time: 4 minutesThomas Traumann is a journalist and independent consultant. He is the author of O Pior Emprego do Mundo (“The Worst Job in the World”), a book about Brazilian finance ministers.



Tags: Bolsonaro, Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
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