In less than a month, Nicolás Maduro is set to begin a third term as Venezuela’s president, even though vote tallies demonstrate that opposition candidate Edmundo González won the election by a landslide. Although the whole international community has an important role in holding Maduro and his elite accountable and supporting the Venezuelan people, all eyes point toward one country: the U.S.
The return of Donald Trump to the presidency has triggered expectations of a return to the “maximum pressure” strategy of his first term. In contrast, many recent commentaries warned about the grave consequences of a return to that policy, suggesting instead a continuation of the sanction-easing measures taken under the Biden administration.
But neither a return to 2019 nor normalizing relations with Maduro will create favorable conditions for a democratic transformation in Venezuela, especially considering the strong grassroots movement that coalesced to back González. New circumstances demand a new strategy.
How did we get here? By December 2023, Maduro had obtained significant concessions from the U.S. These included OFAC’s issuing of licenses to Chevron, another license that temporarily excluded state-owned oil company PDVSA from sanctions, and the pardon of Alex Saab, the mastermind of Maduro’s kleptocracy. For its part, the opposition obtained only vague promises.
Maduro hoped to encourage a divided opposition to boycott the July elections, so that he could achieve an electoral win acceptable enough to restore his international standing and warrant lifting sanctions. But he overestimated his political backing and ignored the opposition’s ability to establish a robust candidacy for Edmundo González. What happened next was a chain of improvisations and overreactions. Once he discovered the true will of the voters, Maduro ordered his electoral authority to proclaim him president-elect without official tallies or transparent results.
What to do with the oil sanctions
So what should be done now? In 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department justified its decision to issue the Chevron licenses based on “specific actions that relieve the suffering of the Venezuelan people and promote the restoration of democracy.” But in 2023 it warned, “Treasury is prepared to amend or revoke authorizations at any time, should representatives of Maduro fail to follow through on their commitments.” We should not doubt the sincerity of those statements; oil licenses were not granted because sanctions failed, but because sanctions were considered the best incentive for negotiations. Hence, licenses could be reverted if Maduro violates commitments.
Because Maduro violated every line of the 2021 Memorandum of Understanding and the 2023 Barbados Agreement, the U.S. government should keep its promise by amending or revoking the oil licenses. Some, however, argue in favor of disregarding those statements and changing the strategy, awarding oil licenses based on specific actions to restore democracy and providing a stable cash flow to Maduro, who should be treated as president.
But maintaining the easing of sanctions, even though Maduro has abandoned any attempt to even simulate actions to restore democracy, would weaken the credibility of U.S. policy. This would in turn eliminate any possibility of relying on those policies as leverage to encourage a negotiated solution.
More oil for fewer migrants?
Another argument proposes that continuing to ease oil sanctions would benefit Venezuela and decrease migration flows. Others suggest maintaining oil licenses because they have brought transparency to the oil industry.
The evidence indicates that these are misguided proposals. Oil production permitted by OFAC licenses lacks the necessary institutional framework to efficiently distribute oil revenues for Venezuelans’ well-being. In fact, this oil production operates under Venezuela’s Anti-Blockade Law, which hinders transparency and accountability while promoting predatory policies such as corruption and human rights violations.
More oil will not deter migration flows because oil revenues cannot be distributed transparently and efficiently. Under the opacity rule imposed by the Anti-Blockade Law, oil revenues will encourage predatory policies, as demonstrated by Maduro’s recent attack on the booming shrimp industry.
OFAC licenses do not tackle the root cause of the migration crisis, which is significant political decay. This decay will likely continue under Maduro’s self-proclamation and the Anti-Blockade Law, increasing pressures on migration flows.
Should we return to maximum pressure?
Normalization policy rests on a misconception: the belief that sanctions should be lifted because they “failed” to promote democracy. The same fallacy can be used to conclude that because the easing policies “failed” to achieve free and fair elections, the only option is to return to the 2019 strategy.
The 2019 U.S. approach to Venezuela faced two primary problems: It lacked a grassroots movement and did not provide a convincing strategy to encourage ruling elites to favor a transition. The latter issue was tackled with the 2020 “Framework for a Peaceful Democratic Transition in Venezuela,” which ended the so-called “maximum pressure” policy. And now, unlike in 2019, Venezuela has a grassroots movement nurtured by the 2023 primaries and galvanized by the July 28 election.
A new approach to new conditions
The recent Bolivar Bill approved by the U.S. House of Representatives and the many statements from the U.S. government acknowledging González as an elected president are signals that bipartisan policy could fine-tine the approach to Venezuela’s current conditions. The alternative to maximum pressure and the sanctions easing policy alike should rely on three key pillars.
The first pillar is respecting the will of Venezuelan voters by acknowledging Edmundo González as their elected president. The July 28 election resulted partly from U.S. support for the Barbados Agreement. Maduro’s elite has chosen to ignore this agreement, but the U.S. should continue to uphold it following the 2023 Bogotá Declaration. Honoring González’s victory will help maintain the grassroots movement promoted by primaries and the election.
The second pillar should be to prevent Maduro from benefiting from oil licenses. Instead of paying Maduro his share of the oil production, oil firms could deposit that share in an escrow account that could eventually be used to finance humanitarian aid through transparent mechanisms.
Finally, the third pillar should be a comprehensive plan that uses personal and economic sanctions to support a democratic transition. This would incentivize ruling elite members to disobey Maduro and pursue political change. Increasing the cost of repression without alleviating the price of dissent will not favor democratic change.
Ignoring Maduro’s predatory nature and pretending that his government can behave rationally to promote the well-being of the people is a grave distortion of the facts. Normalization will only strengthen the ruling elites, endanger human rights, and create conditions that boost migration flows. The best alternative to the easing policy is not to return to 2019 but to advance in response to current conditions, honoring the presidential election results while creating real incentives for a democratic transformation.
