MEXICO CITY—Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Donald Trump made a striking claim: The U.S. has already “knocked down 97% of the drugs” entering the country by sea, and the focus would now shift to land. The comment echoed remarks he made earlier this year, in an interview on Fox News, when he stated that the U.S. would begin “hitting on land” when it comes to drug trafficking organizations. He followed with a blunt assessment: “The cartels run Mexico.”
Taken together, these remarks point to more than campaign rhetoric or media provocation. They reflect a deeper shift underway in Washington—one that redefines Mexican organized crime not primarily as a law-enforcement problem or a bilateral cooperation challenge, but as a direct national security threat to the U.S. That redefinition is already reshaping U.S. policy tools, institutions and expectations vis-à-vis Mexico, with potentially profound consequences for the bilateral relationship.
Over the past year, Washington has increased pressure on Mexico to take decisive action against drug cartels, including proposals that could involve some form of U.S. military presence on Mexican territory. These demands have been paired with repeated warnings from the White House that the status quo is no longer acceptable. The question isn’t whether U.S. pressure will intensify, but how far it might go—and whether Mexico is ready for the scenarios now being openly discussed.
From public health to national security
From the outset of his administration, Trump moved to recast the fentanyl crisis in security terms. He designated six Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), a symbolic but consequential step that expanded the legal authorities available to U.S. agencies. On December 15, 2025, he went further, signing an executive order designating illicit fentanyl and its primary chemical precursors as weapons of mass destruction. The move placed drug trafficking in the same conceptual category as chemical weapons, dramatically widening the federal government’s operational toolkit.
Trump has repeatedly invoked the tens of thousands of Americans killed annually by fentanyl, framing the issue as a moral emergency and a justification for extraordinary action. This rationality has domestic political appeal, but it also signals to Mexico that Washington increasingly views cartel activity as an external threat emanating from beyond U.S. borders—one that may warrant unilateral or semi-unilateral responses.
If this shift were merely rhetorical, it would be easier to dismiss. But it has been accompanied by quieter, institutional changes that suggest sustained intent. On January 15, the U.S. Department of Defense established the Joint Interagency Task Force–Counter Cartel (JIATF-CC) under U.S. Northern Command. Led by Brig. Gen. Maurizio Calabrese, the task force formalizes a “whole-of-government” approach to identifying, disrupting, and dismantling cartel operations deemed a threat to the U.S., particularly along the U.S.–Mexico border. By integrating military intelligence, law enforcement and the broader intelligence community into a single operational framework, Washington moved from signaling resolve to building permanent infrastructure.
The move attracted little public debate in Mexico, despite its implications. Yet the creation of JIATF-CC represents a significant institutionalization of the idea that cartels fall within the remit of U.S. defense planning, not just criminal justice.
Earlier this month, the Senate confirmed Sara Carter, a former Fox News contributor, as director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Carter brings no background in government, public health or law enforcement. What she does bring is a worldview closely aligned with Trump’s and fluency in the language of confrontation. In her testimony, she framed drug trafficking as “a chemical war being waged against the American people,” vowing that cartel “impunity ends now.”
For Mexico, the message is clear: Cooperation is no longer defined narrowly as intelligence-sharing or joint investigations, but increasingly as visible, coercive action.
Adjusting, but not enough
Sheinbaum’s government has shifted away from the “abrazos, no balazos” (hugs, not bullets) doctrine of her predecessor, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and towards a more assertive posture. Authorities have delivered arrests, seizures and the transfer of high-value criminals to U.S. custody. In recent months, Mexico has handed over dozens of inmates linked to organized crime to the U.S., in most cases without a formal extradition process. Still, from Washington’s perspective, these steps have not gone far enough.
Following the recent U.S. military operation in Venezuela, Trump publicly referenced Mexico three times in the span of a week, insisting that “cartels are running Mexico” and “something’s going to have to be done”. Leaks to The New York Times revealed how far Washington is willing to go: The U.S. has pressed Mexico to allow joint operations against fentanyl laboratories, including the presence of U.S. special forces accompanying Mexican troops. Drone strikes have also been discussed—an option that would constitute a direct violation of Mexican sovereignty. However, Mexico has categorically rejected the presence of foreign troops, offering instead deeper intelligence-sharing and for the United States to play a greater role inside command centers.
Reporting by The Wall Street Journal heightened the unease, noting that Mexican security officials are increasingly worried about a scenario once thought unlikely: some form of U.S. military action on Mexican soil. Officials privately describe Washington’s demands as “unsustainable,” extending beyond security cooperation to the potential arrest of Mexican politicians accused of cartel ties.
When trade no longer constrains force
Citing the depth of economic integration between the two countries, many in Mexico continue to argue that U.S. military action is unthinkable. The argument is that the U.S. would not jeopardize its largest trading relationship because doing so would be self-defeating.
That reasoning relies on an outdated assumption—that commerce limits security policy. As discussions in Davos clarified, economic interdependence is now viewed through a geopolitical perspective. Tariffs, financial infrastructure, and supply chains have become tools of influence rather than shields against conflict. In this environment, integration does not prevent coercion—it transforms it.
The conclusion is uncomfortable but increasingly difficult to avoid: The possibility of some form of U.S. military action is now real. Trump’s preference, demonstrated in Syria, Iran and Venezuela, has been to strike and withdraw: Decisive action without prolonged deployment.
Avoiding a point of no return
Trump has pointed to what he calls the “intolerable link” between politics and organized crime in Mexico. Washington has acted on that assessment by canceling visas for Mexican politicians. Mexico, by contrast, has taken no comparable steps to investigate these cases or dismantle the broader architecture of political protection that sustains organized crime.
Persistent allegations involving senior figures within the governing Morena party have become a growing liability. U.S. pressure may give Sheinbaum political cover to act, but confronting corruption within her own ranks remains the hardest—and most revealing—test. A decisive signal would be the investigation or prosecution of sitting senior officials credibly linked to criminal organizations. That line has yet to be crossed.
For Mexico, closer coordination with the U.S. should not be seen as a concession, but as a strategic necessity. Organized crime has overwhelmed parts of the Mexican state and confronting it in isolation is neither realistic nor desirable. Intelligence-sharing, financial tracking and logistical coordination remain the most effective tools against networks that operate seamlessly across borders.
There is precedent. In 2016, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán was captured in an operation led by Mexico’s Navy, with U.S. intelligence and logistical support. The episode demonstrated that effective cooperation is possible without a visible U.S. military footprint.
What Mexico cannot afford is ambiguity. President Sheinbaum should be operating with clearly defined strategies for every plausible scenario: diplomatic, economic and military. Washington already is. Absent contingency planning, Mexico risks reacting under pressure rather than shaping outcomes.
The risk on both sides is miscalculation. A limited U.S. strike intended to deter could trigger political and social shockwaves far beyond its tactical scope. For Mexico, the dilemma would be stark: accept the action as joint and absorb the domestic cost or denounce it and risk a rupture with its most important partner.
The relationship is too central—and too entangled—for shortcuts. Once the line between coordination and force is crossed, even briefly, it will be far harder to redraw.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Brenda Estefan
Reading Time: 5 minutesEstefan is a professor at IPADE Business School in Mexico City and a columnist at Reforma, Mexico’s leading newspaper.
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