CARACAS — Right now, Venezuela is a country of anguish and uncertainty. The exile to Spain of Edmundo González Urrutia, the widely recognized winner of the July 28 election, has taken a toll on the mood of a nation that feels that without democracy, there will be no future, while Nicolás Maduro’s regime tries to consolidate its hold on power by hook or by crook.
To leave behind its electoral debacle, the government is seeking to “normalize” the new situation, and from Miraflores, the presidential palace, Maduro and his dictatorial inner circle are dialing up repression. It seems unlikely that the regime will be deterred by stricter international sanctions from the U.S. and other nations that seem similar to the “maximum pressure” policy of previous years.
So far, Maduro has effectively discouraged the opposition and the democratic international community by resorting to political persecution, arresting more than 2,400 people in connection with post-election protests and instigating fear in those who dare to dissent. Last month, amid criticism of the government crackdown, the National Assembly approved a law granting the regime wide-ranging powers to control and shut down nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Time may be running out for the opposition leadership in Venezuela and abroad, despite close coordination between González Urrutia and María Corina Machado, to reverse expectations about democracy’s future in Venezuela.
Internationally, the government is strengthening its relationship with its partners, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Russia, China, Iran and Turkey. At the same time, Maduro is trying to discourage sanctions or a hardline reaction from democratic governments like the U.S., Brazil, and Colombia by appealing to shared interests such as energy, trade, migration, and investments, as well as the preservation of consular and diplomatic activities.
If Maduro gets his way and takes office in January, the result will be a radicalized government with a smaller, tighter-knit core that seeks consolidation as a new hegemonic authoritarianism in the region. In a continent in which the quality and stability of democracies are in evident decline, Venezuela would formally join the totalitarian regimes of Cuba and Nicaragua.
Bigger challenges
The scenario poses a dilemma to Venezuela’s opposition: Persist in the electoral struggle or consider new ways of confronting the regime.
For now, the core strategy is to continue to defend González Urrutia’s victory. It’s possible to assume the government granted safe passage to González Urrutia out of the country, hoping his departure would demoralize the opposition. But what the Maduro government did not count on is that González Urrutia could resurface emboldened, as seems to have occurred since his arrival in Madrid, thanks to a diaspora demanding his recognition. While the Spanish Congress approved a non-binding resolution recognizing him as president-elect, and Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez met with González Urrutia at the Moncloa Palace on September 12, Spain continues to refuse to accept the July 28 results and is urging Maduro’s administration to release the official vote count.
The question on everyone’s lips is whether González Urrutia would be able to return to Venezuela in January as president-elect. There is no doubt that Machado will remain on the ground, leading a majority that has not given up and continuing to demand the recognition of the election results to begin a democratic transition. It’s fair to expect Machado to stay engaged in this current strategy for the coming months. A potential change of leadership at the White House, with Donald Trump at the helm, may increase tensions between Washington and Caracas, reigniting her fight and reinforcing her role in the current crisis. A scenario with Kamala Harris leading the new government may bring a recalibration of sanctions, keeping Machado as a critical figure in the future steps by the U.S.
For their part, the democratic opposition parties—those not co-opted by the government—are aware they cannot operate under a hegemonic authoritarian regime. There is no significant incentive to get organized for the next election. If election results aren’t recognized and legitimate wins don’t bring change, these parties have no future.
Some sectors of the opposition, especially those under the government’s umbrella, may be considering participating in the regional elections at the end of next year, which could be brought forward as an appeasement mechanism after Maduro’s swearing-in on January 10, 2025. But what happened after July 28 stripped the Venezuelan electoral system of all credibility, so a low level of participation is likely. In other words, the electoral process lost value as a mechanism for political renewal, possibly aggravating the country’s political conflict by “justifying” the use of different means for its resolution.
Weeks ago, Jorge Rodríguez, the president of the National Assembly, announced that those who do not recognize the official verdict of the electoral authority (CNE) and the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) on the July 28 contest would not be able to participate in future elections. This threat confirms the exclusionary character of elections to come, which ends any possibility of competitive and free contests. This is a predictable result of the government’s control over institutions and its incapacity to compete and legitimize itself electorally. It is also what happened under other electoral autocracies in similar circumstances, such as Russia, Belarus, and Nicaragua.
The role of the foreign voices
In this scenario, the international community may play a double role, which may seem contradictory but is, in fact, complementary: pressuring the government and, at the same time, facilitating a possible negotiation process. Therefore, while an essential part of the international community advances with diplomatic pressure for the publication of the vote count and respect for the results, countries closer to Maduro’s government, such as Brazil and Colombia, could have greater influence in a negotiation.
But as long as the current circumstances are sustainable for the government, the chances of a negotiated solution are practically nil.
The truth is that Miraflores is facing international isolation, which encourages its actions even as it limits its room for maneuver. Maduro has been deepening a rapprochement with non-democratic regimes, such as China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua, among others, raising expectations—perhaps excessively—regarding the BRICS meeting in Russia in October, to which Maduro has been invited.
The new context brings critical questions for the opposition’s leadership, Venezuelan society, and the international democratic community. It is up to the leaders to assemble a strategy that will promote the participation of all sectors of society to prevent the consolidation of a totalitarian regime in Venezuela. At the same time, the leaders in exile in Spain will play an essential role in the months to come, convincing and urging the European Parliament to follow what the Spanish Congress did days ago and supporting González Urrutia as a relevant actor from abroad. A change of destiny for the country depends on Venezuelan society and the international community. The future of millions of Venezuelans depends on what happens next.
