The Trump administration’s approach to Latin America is defined by a profound strategic contradiction.
On the one hand, it has elevated counternarcotics to an almost singular priority, authorizing aggressive interdiction operations in the Caribbean and embracing a security-focused logic that, in practice, has involved the U.S. military in extrajudicial killings.
On the other hand, it is simultaneously dismantling the very anti-corruption framework built over the last 50 years that attempted to prevent transnational criminal organizations from becoming so powerful in the first place. By treating anti-drug policy as a problem of force rather than governance, the administration is attacking symptoms while abandoning the structural conditions—specifically corruption, state capture, and impunity—that allow cartels to flourish.
This contradiction is not merely rhetorical; it reflects a deeper retreat from anti-corruption as a core pillar of U.S. policy in the hemisphere. For decades, Republican and Democratic administrations alike recognized that corruption is a strategic threat to all of the Americas: It weakens democratic institutions, empowers criminal networks, distorts markets, and opens the door to foreign adversaries. Today, that bipartisan consensus is collapsing.
The administration’s recently released National Security Strategy makes this retreat unmistakable. In a document outlining U.S. global priorities, corruption receives only cursory mention and is entirely absent as a priority in the Western Hemisphere. This silence comes at a moment when corruption is fueling migration, sustaining organized crime, bolstering authoritarian governments, and hollowing out democratic institutions across Latin America. Yet Washington has stepped back.
Implications across the region
The consequences are visible across multiple fronts. First is the administration’s reduced enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the most important U.S. legal tool for deterring corporate bribery abroad. For years, strong FCPA enforcement not only helped U.S. companies compete fairly but signaled that the United States was committed to strengthening clean governance globally.
Now, enforcement actions have declined sharply after the president’s February 10, 2025 executive order directing the attorney general to “cease initiation of any new FCPA investigations or enforcement actions.” This creates a permissive environment in which corrupt officials can solicit bribes with little fear of U.S. scrutiny, which in turn leaves U.S. firms increasingly vulnerable to adverse actions from corrupt local officials or corrupt foreign companies competing in similar markets.
Even more damaging are political decisions that effectively reward corrupt and anti-democratic leaders. The administration’s pardon of former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, convicted in U.S. courts on drug trafficking charges and proven ties to the Sinaloa Cartel, undermines years of painstaking work by American law enforcement and Honduran reformers. His conviction was a rare example of accountability at the highest levels. Reversing it for political reasons sends a dangerous message: powerful elites, including those linked to transnational criminal organizations, can escape justice if they enjoy the right political alliances.
The same message reverberated when the administration removed former Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes from the Global Magnitsky/OFAC sanctions list despite evidence of alleged corruption and ties to transnational crime. (Cartes has denied wrongdoing.) Magnitsky sanctions are among the most powerful tools the U.S. has to isolate corrupt actors, limit their financial reach, and protect democratic institutions from state capture. Lifting sanctions on individuals credibly accused of criminality undermines years of bipartisan U.S. efforts and emboldens others operating at the nexus of corruption, politics, and organized crime.
This retreat from anti-corruption has profound implications for democratic governance and the rise of authoritarianism. Corruption is the oxygen that sustains authoritarian rule. Politicians in El Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and elsewhere rely on corrupt networks, specifically, business allies, pliant judges, loyal security forces to entrench their power. When the U.S. deprioritizes anti-corruption, these leaders face fewer constraints. They can dismantle checks and balances, intimidate journalists, persecute opponents, and co-opt courts with impunity.
Corruption also accelerates state capture, where political and criminal actors—often intertwined—gain control of state institutions to advance illicit agendas. We have seen this pattern repeatedly: criminal groups bribing police and military officers to secure trafficking routes; political elites manipulating procurement systems for personal gain; businessmen using illicit financing to influence elections; and foreign authoritarian powers exploiting corrupt networks to expand their influence. When Washington signals disinterest, the process of state capture speeds up.
The consequences for U.S. national interests are significant and immediate.
First, weakening anti-corruption efforts creates strategic openings for China, Russia, and Iran. These governments often operate most effectively in opaque environments where corrupt actors can be cultivated through back-channel deals, predatory financing, and political favors.
Second, corruption drives economic collapse and migration pressures. When public funds are stolen, services deteriorate, inequality deepens, and citizens lose faith in democratic governance. The resulting instability inevitably reaches the U.S.—at the border, through humanitarian crises, or via emergency assistance needs.
Third, corruption fuels regional insecurity. Criminal organizations from cartels to human-trafficking networks depend on bribery to maintain safe passage and undermine law enforcement. When the U.S. steps back, these networks thrive, strengthening the same actors responsible for narcotics flows, violence, and instability.
Finally, the administration’s approach abroad mirrors its tolerance for corruption at home. When domestic actors undermine independent institutions or excuse abuses of power, it becomes nearly impossible to credibly advocate for transparency overseas. Governments and other actors in the region are quick to exploit this inconsistency.
If the U.S. hopes to remain a credible leader in the hemisphere, anti-corruption must be restored as a central pillar of U.S. policy. That means revitalizing FCPA enforcement, upholding sanctions on corrupt actors, and ensuring that the rule of law and not political expediency guides decisions.
The costs of inaction are mounting. By abandoning anti-corruption efforts, the U.S. is empowering authoritarians, accelerating state capture, and undermining its own strategic interests. The longer Washington retreats, the more corrupt and unstable all of the Americas will become.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Frank O. Mora
Reading Time: 4 minutesMora is Professor of Politics and International Relations and Senior Research Scientist at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, Florida International University. He is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (2009-2013) and U.S. Ambassador to the OAS (2023-2025).
