Grassroots Efforts for Immigration Reform: Voices from Michigan, New York, and Colorado

September 1, 2010

Over the past several years, grassroots groups across the country have held mass marches, lobbied government officials and used civil disobedience to call for reform of the nation’s immigration system. As part of a continuing series of interviews on the prospects of comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) and the pro-CIR movement, I interviewed grassroots leaders from Michigan, New York and Colorado to explore the strategies of—and challenges faced by—groups in different parts of the country:

• Ponsella Hardaway is the Executive Director of Metropolitan Organizing Strategy Enabling Strength (MOSES) in Michigan, a member of the Gamaliel Foundation's organizing network.
• Andrew Friedman is the co-Executive Director of Make the Road New York
• Julie Gonzales is an organizer at the Colorado Immigrant Rights Coalition (CIRC) and the Colorado State Director for the Reform Immigration for America (RIFA) campaign.

MOSES, Make the Road, and CIRC have also signed on as member organizations of the broader Reform Immigration for America (RIFA) campaign to achieve national comprehensive immigration reform.

Altschuler: How long has your organization been working on immigration issues, and how did it first get involved?

Friedman: Make the Road has been working on this issue since its foundation in 1997 in the aftermath of unsuccessful national immigration reform and punitive welfare reform that targeted immigrants. Most of our initial organizing campaigns focused on local treatment of immigrants. Back in 2005-2006, it felt like there was some momentum emerging in the backlash to the Sensenbrenner bill [the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005]. That’s when we started to have substantive conversations about tactics and strategies for organizing committee meetings and participating in coalition work, both nationally and locally, on the issue. Since then, we’ve grown considerably, so this time around we were more active.

Hardaway: MOSES has been working on the issue since the founding of our organization in 1997. One of our members, Holy Redeemer—probably the largest Latino congregation in the city—has been a part of MOSES since the beginning. Because of its involvement, we started out working on local neighborhood issues, like crime and the rise of gangs. Then, out of that, we began looking at the young people who were brought over as children—they didn’t necessarily see Mexico as their home, they went through the Detroit public school system, but they could not go to college without going back to Mexico and paying foreign rates for tuition. So our first big action, back in 2002, was around fighting for in-state tuition for undocumented students, so that they could at least go to college.

Altschuler: What has your organization learned from the last failed effort for immigration reform in 2007?  How, if at all, are you approaching the current effort differently?

Friedman: After 2007, we had considerable work to do with our allies—strong institutional allies like labor unions, nationally powerful Democrats—as well as with folks who were not necessarily with us on the issue. We came out of that thinking a couple of things: one, we really needed to build our political sophistication and muscle and two, we needed to ensure there wouldn’t be a split between the AFL-CIO and Change to Win—two major union partners—on the substance of the legislation.

This time, we were just positioned differently. Our representative in Congress [Nydia Velázquez] was the head of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and Senator Schumer was the third highest-ranking Democrat. So we have been working more on local actions and local relationships to make an impact on the national struggle.

Hardaway: The biggest struggle in our organization was developing a relationship [with non-immigrant groups on this issue]. In 2007 we aggressively moved to immigration reform without building a strong multi-racial base. There were many African-Americans in our organization who didn’t understand—especially when we used the term ‘civil rights’ of immigrants. African-Americans said, ‘We’ve been fighting for civil rights for a long time. Why is this important for us [if we haven’t won our fight yet]?’  It’s important to have the conversation about how immigration impacts everyone and how we can find common ground around what’s being done to minorities in general in this country and the government’s role in that.

One of the things that MOSES did do was take on racial profiling. We got together as an organization and discussed racial profiling, working towards an ordinance in Detroit. We also got together around affirmative action, which was a big issue in Michigan. That was where we got a multi-racial coalition. It didn’t focus necessarily on immigration reform, but it took up the common things that affected us all. And then [in 2007-2008] we had some dialogue about immigration from a faith perspective, simultaneous to working aggressively on immigration reform.

Gonzales: Our coalition [in Colorado] began in October of 2006. Everybody understood the fight, but for us, it didn’t feel like there was necessarily a way to plug in. We weren’t doing the day-to-day lobbying. We needed to find a way to engage the local communities, to make sure everyone could participate, including young people. With the DREAM Act effort of October, 2007, there was creative, new, engaging, exciting work in which people could become involved. We did things in Colorado—like lobby visits with State legislators in Spanish—that helped gear us up for the latest efforts. The RIFA campaign [is focused on] trying to marry those two worlds of political lobbying and grassroots organizing. We don’t have everything figured out, but we’re doing better.

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Legislative Prospects for Immigration Reform: An Interview with Marshall Fitz

August 19, 2010

Despite political pronouncements from President Obama and key legislators early this year, immigration reform now seems to have slipped off of the Congressional agenda.  As part of an ongoing series of interviews on the prospects for comprehensive immigration reform (CIR), I spoke with Marshall Fitz to explore the current context in the Beltway.  Mr Fitz is the Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress and has been a key legislative strategist for the current Reform Immigration for America (RIFA) campaign.

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Organizing for Immigration Reform: An Interview with Deepak Bhargava

August 16, 2010

As part of a series of interviews on the prospects for comprehensive immigration reform, I recently spoke with Deepak Bhargava, Executive Director of the Center for Community Change (CCC). (Disclosure: I worked as a consultant for CCC on a different issue in 2008.) CCC has been a core group in the movement for comprehensive immigration reform over the past several years, playing a central role in the Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CCIR) through 2007 and the current Reform Immigration for America (RIFA) campaign. Mr. Bhargava sits on RIFA’s management team, and he spoke with me on issues ranging from the prospects for reform this year, the potential impact of Latino voters and grassroots mobilizations, and the challenges facing progressive groups in the wake of Arizona’s controversial immigration law and in the run-up to the mid-term elections.

Altschuler: How did you first get involved with the movement for comprehensive immigration reform (CIR)?

Bhargava: I was there pretty much at the beginning, around 1998-1999. In that period, a group of immigrant leaders approached me and the Center for Community Change with the idea of doing a national campaign to win legalization for the growing population of undocumented people in the US. At that time, the topic was unspeakable in polite Washington conversation discourse—no politician, no national advocacy organization would tackle it. Partly because of the extraordinary quality

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In Honduras, Rural School Jobs Handed to President’s Supporters

July 26, 2010

In “Power to the Parents,” an article in the Summer AQ, Daniel Altschuler looks at community run schools in Honduras and Guatemala.

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Recent Honduran press reports have honed in on a spate of partisan teacher firings in the country’s primary education program for remote, rural communities, PROHECO (Honduran Community Education Program, Programa Hondureño de Educación Comunitaria). Journalists have documented how President Lobo's Partido Nacional has replaced field staff with party activists, canceled teachers' contracts to install party supporters and undermined parent organizations' autonomy.

These reports suggest that the new ruling party has used PROHECO to divert resources and jobs to its followers, undermining the program's ability to realize its stated objectives. Just criticizing the Partido Nacional, however, ignores the broader problem with PROHECO, a program that reflects the pervasive clientelistic politics upon which both dominant Honduran political parties rely.

PROHECO emerged in the late 1990s as an alternative education model to expand education coverage in remote rural areas. PROHECO, like other community-managed school (also known as school-based management) programs in Central America, gave parents the right to hire and fire teachers in new rural schools and pay salaries based on attendance. The program aimed to increase accountability and empower parents to take on roles of responsibility within their communities. Recent reports in the major Honduran newspapers, however, have highlighted how the Partido Nacional has replaced all of PROHECO's field staff and tried to force out teachers hired under the previous administration. Reporters have documented local party and program officials, all of whom are partisan activists, cancelling teachers' contracts that were signed for the entire 2010 school year and forcing parents to elect new leaders if the current school council members refuse to replace the current teacher with a Partido Nacional loyalist.

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Anniversary of a Coup: Insecurity, Impunity and Isolation in Honduras

July 1, 2010

One year ago this week, the Honduran military expelled President Manuel Zelaya from the country. The coup immediately prompted domestic tumult and international condemnation.  With elections in November, however, the Honduran political establishment and the Obama administration banked on the country moving beyond the coup domestically and normalizing relations with the world.  But theirs were rose-colored glasses; a coup’s effects are not so easily undone.

Honduras is now struggling with the long-term damage that coups inflict on the rule of law and the enduring costs of international isolation.  Even after de facto President Roberto Micheletti ceded power to Porfirio Lobo following an election, insecurity and impunity reign domestically, and most of Latin America continues to isolate the country.  The battle for international legitimacy remains President Lobo’s principal concern, and has also brought issues onto the domestic agenda that put Lobo at loggerheads with powerful supporters of last year’s coup.

Many on the Right claim that, by ousting Zelaya, the political establishment was responding legitimately to an over-reaching president.  And, indeed, in the first half of 2009, Zelaya flouted court rulings that deemed unconstitutional a referendum that would pave the way for a constituent assembly.  At one stage, Zelaya and his supporters seized referendum ballots held by the military under Supreme Electoral Tribunal orders.

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Honduras’ Truth Commission Controversy

April 23, 2010

The Truth Commission mandated by last year’s Tegucigalpa / San José Accord now appears ready to get to work in Honduras, but controversy has already ensnared it.  Supporters of last year’s coup are demanding that the government let sleeping dogs lie, while their opponents fear that the Commission will fail to deliver an honest account of the coup.

Meanwhile, the Commission already appears to be hedging on how much truth it will deliver, another troubling sign for a country where sunlight has never been in greater demand.

Signed on October 30, 2009, the Tegucigalpa / San José Accord once promised the end of Honduras’ political crisis.  The Accord failed, however, because it did not stipulate a deadline for the congressional vote on Manuel Zelaya’s restitution, which ultimately led then-President Zelaya to pull his support.  Meanwhile, de facto President Roberto Micheletti and key international players—including the U.S. government—clung to the Accord, claiming it was still in effect.  Since President Porfirio Lobo took office in late January, he has maintained this line and worked tirelessly to restore international recognition to the Honduran government.  The formation of the Truth Commission represents a crucial final step along this path, and the eight-month process stands ready to begin on May 4.

But Lobo’s government faces significant pressure from various sectors of Honduran society.  Coup supporters have already said that they have no faith in the process, arguing that it is nothing more than a show for the international community.  As has been true since last year’s coup, the Honduran Right continues to call for “national unity” and “consensus,” which in this case appears to mean a Truth Commission that does not rock the boat.  Right-wing opponents have also lobbied to exclude human rights violations from the Commission’s purview, which have continued after Lobo took office.

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Constitutional Court Orders Removal of Guatemalan Education Minister

February 26, 2010

On February 25, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court ordered the removal of Education Minister Bienvenido Argueta for failing to provide the court with complete information regarding the beneficiaries of President Álvaro Colóm’s flagship social program, Mi Familia Progresa.  This latest development in a months-old political drama augurs poorly for Guatemala’s fragile education system and President Colóm’s claims to be supporting transparency measures in this notoriously corrupt nation.

Mi Familia Progresa (MFP) is Guatemala’s conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, which provides cash payments to poor mothers, conditional upon them sending their children to school and for health check-ups.  CCT programs have become increasingly popular in Latin America, as they have shown demonstrably positive results on school enrolment and child health. 

President Colóm has hailed MFP as the cornerstone of his anti-poverty platform in Guatemala, but critics have argued that Colóm has used the program to reward voters who supported him in the 2007 elections.  Colóm’s critics also worry that the president has been transferring funds from other ministries to the program to use it as a campaign tool for his wife, Sandra Torres de Colóm, the coordinator and face of the Council of Social Cohesion that oversees MFP.

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The Honduran Dam Controversy and Micheletti’s Legacy

February 19, 2010

Roberto Micheletti’s de facto government is back in the news. Last week, news broke in Honduras that the official newspaper, La Gaceta, published two different versions with the same number and date in the last days of Micheletti’s time in the Presidential Palace. The major difference? One version contained a controversial dam contract. After many months of Micheletti promoting his de facto government as the clean and honest side of the Liberal Party, the gacetazo (as the Honduran media has deemed the scandal) will further mar the legacy of Micheletti and his supporters.

In their last days in office, presidents often sign controversial decrees that would have proved too controversial earlier in their term. In the United States, for instance, recent presidents have extended pardons to convicts and established vast natural reserves. Presidents must be careful, however, not to over-step in their last days, or else their legacy will be stained by controversy. President Clinton, for instance, went too far when he pardoned Mark Rich, sparking allegations that the wealthy Rich had purchased his freedom with political contributions.

In Honduras, it seems that Roberto Micheletti’s de facto government, with the Congress his party controlled, could not resist the temptations of the last days in office, either. Just before relinquishing power, Micheletti and the Congress rushed to approve a $160 million contract to operate and improve the José Cecilio del Valle Dam (better known as the Nacaome Dam). In January, the Honduran Congress sped through the process of granting the contract to a Honduran-Italian consortium. Then-President of the Congress, José Alfredo Saavedra, argued that Congress had recently fast-tracked laws, including the general amnesty passed in January, so the contract should not raise concerns. After the congressional vote, Roberto Micheletti signed the contract into law in his last cabinet meeting.

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Central America’s Rule of Law: Guatemala Captures Portillo But Honduras Rewards Micheletti

January 27, 2010

For decades, impunity has reined in Central America. Dictatorial rule, coups, murder, and genocide have, for the most part, gone unpunished. This month, however, events in Guatemala have suggested a potential turning of the tide. In the last three weeks, Guatemalan authorities have solved the potentially destabilizing Rosenberg case and arrested ex-President Alfonso Portillo for money laundering $70 million when he was in power. Meanwhile, in Honduras, the rule of law appears as in jeopardy as ever, as the Congress has rewarded de facto President Roberto Micheletti and pledged amnesty for all those involved in ousting President Manuel Zelaya. When it comes to the rule of law, Honduras lags as far behind as ever.

Since the Peace Accords brought Guatemala’s 36-year civil war to an end in 1996, Guatemalan activists and international observers have demanded justice for the state-sponsored genocide in the 1980s. For the most part, however—as in most of Latin America—justice has not come. Moreover, since the late 1990s, crime has spiraled out of control, perceptions of corruption are high, and the legal system has proved incapable of apprehending and prosecuting both common criminals and thieving politicians. Pervasive impunity partially explains the horrific practice of lynchings that plagues Guatemala. But the failing of the rule of law in the region also contributes to Guatemalans’ disenchantment with democracy (desencanto democrático).

Not only have Guatemalan voters lost faith in democratic government’s ability to bring economic development and alleviate massive poverty, but vast swaths of the citizenry have come to believe that the laws simply do not apply to the powerful. As the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has shown, perceptions of corruption and insecurity negatively affect democratic values in Guatemala. Compared with other Latin American countries, it is unsurprising that Guatemala ranks low in popular preference for democracy as a form of government.

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As Central America's Economies Struggle, Guatemala Digs in for a Tax Fight

December 24, 2009

The global economic decline has hit Central America hard. Unemployment has increased, remittances from emigrants have declined and governments face rising deficits and debt that jeopardize their ability to meet increased social demands. The story is similar in much of the world, but the situation is particularly precarious in these countries, because they are among the poorest nations in the Americas and have weak economic and social safety nets.

Governments in the region have responded to the economic decline by promoting fiscal adjustments to improve their balance sheets. El Salvador recently passed a gasoline tax and revised its value-added tax, and President Mauricio Funes hopes to pass tax increases on liquor, tobacco and luxury goods. In Honduras, de facto President Roberto Micheletti proposed sweeping reforms, before withdrawing the media-dubbed paquetazo due to pressure from Congress and president-elect Porfirio Lobo to put off major legislation until the new government assumes power. Meanwhile, Guatemala has witnessed the fiercest budget fight of all. Supporters of President Álvaro Colóm’s proposed reform have taken to the streets and threatened opposition legislators, but these efforts have failed to keep Colóm’s opponents from obstructing congressional proceedings. Thus far, Colóm appears to be losing the legislative battle.

Taxation is a contentious issue in every country in the world, but the topic is especially fraught in Guatemala. Guatemala has long had the lowest tax ratio—tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product—in Latin America, a region notorious for weak tax collection. The low tax ratio is part of a legacy of a racist, extractive Guatemalan state, predicated on making profits for economic elites through the cheap (for many decades, forced) labor of a predominantly indigenous majority. Since the state cared little about the needs of most Guatemalan citizens throughout most of the country’s history, social spending was minimal and taxes remained negligible.

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Lynching Persists in Guatemala

December 15, 2009

Lynchings are wreaking havoc again in rural Guatemala. In a recent 15-day span, nine people have been lynched here by citizens who chose to take justice into their own hands. And in the past year, lynch mobs have attacked over 250 people, resulting in at least 42 deaths. The numbers are scary, and they reflect the reality that Guatemala has not forgotten a crucial part of its grisly past. In addition to the deaths caused, the lynchings reflect the inadequacy and inaccessibility of state justice institutions and the legacies of violence from civil war and state-sponsored genocide.

Lynching may seem like an antiquated concept to Americans, but it remains a very real part of rural Guatemalan life. The practice of linchamientos differs somewhat from the mob-led hangings of African-Americans that once plagued the American South. Instead, Guatemalan lynch mobs resort to stoning, beating or pouring gasoline on victims and setting them on fire, often resulting in death. Petty criminals have been the most frequent targets, but lynch mobs have also attacked figures of state authority (such as a judge who issued an unpopular rape verdict). Some reports have even attributed lynchings to drug gangs seeking to eliminate competitors.

In the Americas, lynching is not unique to Guatemala. Carlos Vilas has also documented cases in Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, and Brazil, most often in areas where the state is weak (see below). But lynchings have been particularly pervasive in Guatemala, where the practice attracted a lot of attention immediately after the 1996 Peace Accords. From 1996 to 2000 alone, scholars noted well over 300 lynchings in Guatemala. A decade later, the practice seemed to have subsided somewhat, with only eight deaths in 2008. One might have hoped that the practice would have been headed for the dustbin of history, but the figures from 2009 suggest otherwise.

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From Tegucigalpa: Preliminary Election Analysis, Part Two

December 8, 2009

With the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) nearing completion of its first pass through Honduras’ election results, a more subtle (albeit still incomplete) analysis has become possible. What is certain is that the National Party won an unprecedented victory. What remains in question is precisely why. Answering this question requires a closer examination at voter participation trends in previous elections and inferential analysis of what took place in 2009. Below, I first present the results, before offering a hypothesis to explain them.

The Results

Porfirio Lobo and the National Party won a landslide victory at every level of government. In the presidential elections, the National Party took upwards of 55 percent of votes cast, while the Liberal Party—long the numerically dominant party in Honduras—could not even muster 40 percent. In the Congress, the National Party won over 70 seats of a total of 128. And, in the mayoral races, the National Party has carried more than 200 of 298 municipalities. The final tallies may differ in a handful of races, but the general trend—a National Party routing of the Liberal Party—will hold.

To put this trouncing in perspective: since political liberalization and civilian elections in 1981, no presidential candidate has received 54 percent of valid votes (not to speak of total votes cast). Furthermore, consider the last time that the National Party won the elections (only the second time since 1981). The winning presidential candidate, Ricardo Maduro, won with less than 50 percent of votes cast (52 percent of valid votes), and the National Party obtained neither an outright majority in Congress (it got 61 seats) nor among mayoralties (it won 148 of 298 municipalities).

In fact, after both the 2001 and 2005 elections, the winning party won only a plurality in Congress, forcing it to form coalitions to pass legislation. For the next four years, the National Party will not face this obstacle. This could further marginalize the three smaller parties (Democratic Unification party—UD, the Christian Democratic Party of Honduras—DC and the Innovation and Unity Party—PINU). Moreover, the UD’s very existence stands in question, given sharp internal divisions about whether to participate in the elections (the party decided to participate only a week before the election) and the party’s predictably miserable showing.

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From Tegucigalpa. Winner is Clear, But Turnout Questions Remain

November 30, 2009

Porfirio Lobo will be Honduras’s next President.  Consistent with recent polls, Lobo, the National Party candidate, won a resounding victory over Liberal Party candidate Elvin Santos.  The results were unambiguous, and Santos quickly conceded victory while Lobo and the National Party celebrated their victory.  This sharply contrasts with the 2005 elections, when doubts remained about the results for over a week and speculation about vote-rigging abounded.  In 2009, conversely, the question is not who won, but how many people voted.  The turnout question will now become the centerpiece of the debate on the election.

After rampant speculation regarding possible Election Day protests and violence, Sunday’s elections took place under relative tranquility.  The military and police were out in full force on Sunday to protect the elections, and security concerns were high enough to warrant canceling flights from the United States.  There was some reported repression of protesters in San Pedro Sula, raids on pro-Zelaya groups’ offices, and temporary jamming of pro-Zelaya media.  Generally, however, Honduras was quiet, and those that opposed the elections stayed at home instead of risking arrest by protesting.  By mid-afternoon, the capital was a ghost town, with political propaganda everywhere but virtually no one on the streets and few cars on the road.   

Soon after the polls closed, the presidential results were clear.  Porfirio Lobo won well over 50 percent of the vote, while Elvin Santos received less than 40 percent.  This result was predictable.  Though significantly more Hondurans self-identify as Liberals, the June coup and ensuing political crisis have deeply fractured the Liberal Party.  Many Liberals who identified with the deposed president, Manuel Zelaya, vowed to stay away from the polls.  As one Liberal Party poll worker in Tegucigalpa, Miriam DeVicente, explained on Sunday afternoon, once the polls were virtually empty, “I think that from the Liberal Party many people have stayed away.”  Meanwhile, other voters punished the Liberal Party for the political crisis that took place on its watch.

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The Clergy and the Coup

November 20, 2009

Earlier this week, Mary Anastasia O’Grady shamelessly pulled the God card to defend the Honduran coup. Specifically, she handed her Wall Street Journal column over to the coup-supporting Cardinal Rodriguez to curry favor for the June 28 ousting of President Manuel Zelaya from power. Her article ignores the Church’s troubling historical role in Honduran politics, instead granting this institution legitimacy as the defender of democracy. O’Grady should have known better.

O’Grady’s piece is one in a long line of conservative attempts to justify the overthrow of a democratically-elected president. Christopher Sabatini and I have already debunked these arguments, so I will not do so again here. But this week’s novelty was O’Grady’s use of a deeply controversial Church leader as a mouthpiece for the argument she has been making for months. In her article, she explains why Cardinal Rodriguez supported the coup—what he argues was a “constitutional succession”—namely, that Zelaya undermined the rule of law and therefore lost the “moral authority” to govern the nation.

The Cardinal’s concerns with the rule of the law are legitimate. Manuel Zelaya did not respect the principle of horizontal accountability—a central tenet in liberal democracies. But using the rule of law to justify forcibly removing a president without due process is deeply contradictory. Worse still is the Cardinal’s retreat to “moral authority”—should the military also remove a president at gunpoint for infidelity, supporting abortion rights or promoting secular education?

But the biggest problem with O’Grady’s piece is her uncritical acceptance of the Honduran Church as an institution deeply concerned with the struggle for social justice and democracy. This portrayal is ahistorical and wrong.

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The Municipal Politics of the Honduran Crisis

November 17, 2009

Since the June 28th coup removed Honduran President Manuel Zelaya from power, the de facto government of Roberto Micheletti has vigorously defended the upcoming elections as the way out of the political crisis.  In recent weeks, the central question has become whether the international community will recognize the upcoming presidential elections.  With the breakdown of negotiations and Zelaya’s recent declaration that he will not accept restitution from the Congress (itself increasingly unlikely), the Organization of American States (OAS) will almost certainly not send election observers.  Conversely, Panama, Colombia and the United States have indicated they will recognize the elections, which undermines the previous international consensus on the Honduran crisis. 

Meanwhile, last week, independent presidential candidate Carlos H. Reyes pulled out of the race because President Zelaya had not yet been restored.  Cesar Ham, the other pro-Zelaya candidate, will decide this week whether to end his presidential bid, as well. 

But the other major story last week was that Rodolfo Padilla Sunseri, mayor of San Pedro Sula (the country’s second-largest city and commercial hub), has pulled out of his re-election race.  This serves as an important reminder that these elections will determine—in addition to the President and the 128 members of Congress—the mayors of all 298 Honduran municipalities.  Padilla Sunseri’s resignation reveals the importance of municipal politics a lens for understanding the last five months in Honduras.  Honduran municipalities aligned with Zelaya have been hit hardest by the coup, and their plight reflects the political divisions within the country, the duplicity of the Micheletti regime and the difficult decision facing pro-Zelaya candidates.

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Stakes Rise for the United States in Honduras

November 10, 2009

The stakes for the United States in the Honduran political crisis are higher than ever. At the end of October, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton celebrated the unprecedented overturning of a coup through dialogue. That assessment has now proved naïve, and the State Department finds itself in the awkward position of distancing itself from the rest of Latin America after saying it would recognize the Honduran elections whether or not Manuel Zelaya is restored to power. This crisis is an extremely important moment for Honduras, but it also now has the potential to undermine the Obama administration’s efforts to mend the United States’ relationship with Latin America.

Since President Obama took office, his administration has worked hard to heal the wounds left by President George W. Bush in Latin America. Obama’s most symbolic moves came with respect to Cuba, as he condoned the island nation’s re-admission into the Organization of American States (OAS)—long a rallying cry of the OAS’s other members—and eased the terms of the embargo. Obama has also toned down the rhetoric vis-à-vis Venezuela, cutting away at Hugo Chávez’ platform for America-bashing. Whereas President Bush seemed to court confrontation in the region, the Obama administration has thus far sought compromise and consensus. These efforts have not radically altered U.S. policy, but they have represented significant first steps toward repairing relations with Latin America.

Before last week, the United States had also marched in step with the rest of the Americas in its response to Honduras’ June 28th coup. The United States supported the OAS’s denunciation of the coup, suspended aid to Honduras and visas to leaders of the de facto regime and continually demanded the restitution of President Manuel Zelaya. Until late October, the U.S. assiduously avoided taking the lead on the Honduras issue, instead abiding by regional consensus and making sure not to stoke the flames with Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) nations. State Department representative Thomas Shannon’s deal-making visit to Honduras also built directly on the work of the OAS and Costa Rican President Óscar Arias, assuring that the fleeting victory was shared by all partners.

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After Optimism, A Predictable Standstill in Honduras

October 21, 2009

Last week, Honduras’s World Cup qualification left the country glowing with optimism.  Now, irrepressible hope and joy have again given way to a grimmer reality: political negotiations have hit a wall. 

After finding agreement on the first seven of eight points on the agenda, the Guaymuras Dialogue negotiators have reached a predictable impasse on the most contentious point: Manuel Zelaya’s restitution.  Since Friday, the two teams have been sending proposals and counter-proposals back and forth.  Zelaya’s side has called for the Congress as adjudicator, while Roberto Micheletti’s side has insisted that the Supreme Court settle the issue. Now, the Micheletti negotiators have proposed getting reports from both branches of government before settling the issue, which Zelaya’s team has rejected.

Zelaya’s negotiators have now accused the other side of obstructionism, and they’re right.  On first glance, it seems reasonable to ask the Supreme Court to settle a clearly constitutional issue.  But, as Victor Meza expressed, the judiciary has already offered its judgment—since the coup, the Supreme Court has sided with the “constitutional succession” version of the story, supported Micheletti’s government, and roundly condemned Zelaya at every turn.  Thus, appealing to the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter at this point would be akin to double jeopardy—with the same case and the same jury, could anyone really expect a different result?

Interestingly, it’s not clear that Zelaya’s proposal would get him the result he wants.  Since the coup, the Congress has also consistently sided with Micheletti.  In addition, leading members of Congress have suggested that they would have to defer to the Supreme Court on constitutional issues. So a favorable finding for Zelaya—who has already given up the possibility of amnesty—is no foregone conclusion. That said, Zelaya seems to be banking on congressional representatives’ greater stake in internationally recognized elections, even if it means accepting Zelaya’s brief return to power. 

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Against the Odds, Progress in Honduras?

October 15, 2009

Minor miracles can happen, after all. After beating El Salvador, Honduras qualified for the World Cup when the United States scored a goal to tie Costa Rica in the final minute. In seconds, Hondurans’ emotions flipped 180 degrees—from exasperation at thinking they had come up just short to jubilation at qualifying for the World Cup for the first time in 28 years. From coffee country to the Caribbean coast, Hondurans celebrated with fireworks, flags, honking cars, and screams of joy.

As one announcer remarked, one can only hope that the country’s political leaders follow the national team’s cue and make this a great week for Honduras. And, against the odds, a political resolution may be on its way. In recent days, the Guaymuras Dialogue has brought relative calm to the political crisis. Progress has remained frustratingly slow, but each team seems to have brought a welcome dose of maturity to the negotiating table. The focus on the negotiators—none of them show-stealers—has provided a refreshing change-of-pace from Micheletti and Zelaya’s tired rants and reckless stunts.

On Wednesday afternoon, the negotiators temporarily withdrew to consult with Zelaya and Micheletti. Victor Meza, one of Zelaya’s three negotiators, claimed that negotiators had reached a provisional agreement on the final point of contention—Zelaya’s possible restitution—and simply had to get final approval from Zelaya and Micheletti. Meanwhile, Micheletti’s negotiators said they had completed 90 percent of the agenda and would likely conclude matters by the week’s end, but denied that they had reached such an agreement.

Now, rumors are swirling. Some say that all that remains is for negotiators to agree on the date of Zelaya’s return. Others say that both sides have agreed to renounce the presidency and hand over power to a third party. Declarations and denials abound; the truth remains elusive.

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Soccer and the Political Crisis in Honduras

October 12, 2009

Hondurans had high hopes for two things last week: qualifying for the World Cup and settling the political crisis.  Unfortunately for the catrachos (Hondurans), they came up short in both.  And the country’s two failures mirrored one another.

High hopes dominated Honduras in the run-up to Saturday’s World Cup qualifying match against the United States.  But after coming out hot and scoring first, Honduras surrendered three straight goals.  The team’s captain then sealed its fate when he missed a penalty kick to tie the game with four minutes remaining.  At the end of the night, fans were left incredulous. One television announcer bemoaned the Honduran players’ lack of “emotional equilibrium,” while another commentator pleaded with viewers not to shoot their guns in the air in despair.  Bullets that go up also come down, he explained, without the slightest trace of irony.

Honduras’ loss shared various elements with the latest round of political negotiations, the Guaymuras Dialogue: high expectations, unstable leadership and the specter of more violence.

First, high expectations.  Last week, the mainstream press (which supports Roberto Micheletti) and the country’s politicians made the end of the political crisis appear all but guaranteed.  Dialogue, dialogue, dialogue—this became the welcome mantra after weeks of violence.  But, as in soccer, political expectations can mask reality.

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From Tegucigalpa. Xenophobia and Racism in the Honduran Crisis

October 7, 2009

The political crisis has brought out the worst of Honduras.  The media has already documented many of the country’s ills since June: the reliance on the military to address internal political problems and the sharp polarization with Cold War echoes as well as political violence, repression and censorship.  One nasty phenomenon, however, has slipped under the radar: the frightening nationalist sentiment, xenophobia and racism that have been on display since June 28—the day of the coup.  Hondurans on both sides of this crisis have continually failed to recognize that substantial domestic support exists for both Manuel Zelaya and Roberto Micheletti, and that these domestic forces are willing and able to mobilize themselves.  They have proceeded by first defining “us”—the true Hondurans who

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From Tegucigalpa. Honduran Leaders Fumble, Crisis Worsens

October 1, 2009

Events in Honduras have taken a turn for the worse in the past ten days, and, sadly, there have been no capable leaders from whom Hondurans can expect progress.   Roberto Micheletti and Manuel Zelaya have shown themselves to be political novices without the maturity and intellect to guide this country out of this crisis.

De facto President Roberto Micheletti can’t seem to make up his mind about whether he wants to be a good democrat or a good autocrat.  First, last week, Micheletti let the military and police run amok in the capital.  The result: hundreds of people detained and injured and as many as 10 killed.  Then, on Sunday, Micheletti declared a state of exception in the country, suspending for up to 45 days (with the possibility of renewal) the inviolability of personal freedom, freedom of assembly, free speech, freedom of movement, and due process.  He then proceeded to raid and shut down the two national television and radio outlets that supported Zelaya.  Micheletti’s government also refused to allow entry to an Organization of American States (OAS) delegation to enter the country and demanded that Brazil define Zelaya’s status as visitor.

So far, good autocrat, right?  But Micheletti hasn’t even been able to get that part right.  Less than one day after declaring the state of exception, Micheletti turned on his heels, apologized to Hondurans and said he would try to lift certain provisions this week.  Why?  First, he received heavy international criticism.  As a State Department spokesman lamented, “I think it's time for the de facto regime to put down the shovel. With every action they keep on making the hole deeper.” Second, Honduran congressmen and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal informed Micheletti that the state of exception would leave only two weeks for free campaigning before the scheduled elections, for which they desperately want international legitimacy.  Shockingly, it seems that Micheletti—Honduras’ loudest election cheerleader—had not even considered this.

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From Tegucigalpa. The Rural Population is the Third Face of Honduras in this Crisis

September 29, 2009

Since Manuel Zelaya’s surreptitious return to Honduras last week, the media has focused on the hordes of Zelaya supporters trying to make their way to the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa and the military and police repression that these would-be protesters faced.  But there are three faces to Honduran society these days, not two.  No doubt, these predominantly urban actors are crucial in this country’s short-term political crisis.  But understanding the broader domestic political reality, and what may follow this crisis, also demands consideration of rural areas.

The first face of the current Honduran crisis is the pro-Zelaya Resistencia (Resistance).  Tens of thousands of Zelaya supporters from all over the country took to the streets this week.  They were met by a repressive military machine.  Hundreds arrested and injured, detainees corralled in the stadium and several people killed—these scenes provided a tragic reminder of the military repression that plagued Latin America in previous decades.  And yet, Zelaya’s supporters remain intent on reclaiming power and going ahead with the constituent assembly that started this mess.  While Tegucigalpa has calmed down after several days of curfews, the Resistance remains a significant political force, capable of mobilizing thousands in Tegucigalpa and other secondary cities and towns.

De facto President Roberto Micheletti’s urban supporters form the second face of Honduras.  This group cheers the military in the streets and refuses to believe that people are being wrongfully detained, beaten or even killed.  Those Micheletti backers who acknowledge these unfortunate events say that repression is the necessary price in the war against Zelaya’s attempt to sow unrest and install chavismo (Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’ brand of politics).  Unlike Zelaya supporters, these Hondurans recognize the planned November elections as legitimate.  They too are capable of mobilizing thousands of supporters, but their mobilizations also have a strong military flavor. 

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From Tegucigalpa. Independence Day Revealed Deep Divisions in Honduras

September 21, 2009

Last week, tens of thousands of Hondurans took to the streets of their capital, Tegucigalpa, to commemorate Independence Day.  One group, dressed in the white and blue of the Honduran flag, followed the Civic-Military March to the National Stadium, where soldiers marched, paratroopers landed dramatically, and the crowd cheered for de facto President Roberto Micheletti. 

The other group, equally large, dressed in red and marched down Morazán Boulevard for La Resistencia (the resistance), and clamored for the return of President Manuel Zelaya to power while booing the military planes flying toward the stadium.  From among the Micheletti supporters, the megaphones exclaimed: “Honduras is the wall that finally stopped Chávez!”  Meanwhile, the red shirts cried out, “Which is the way?  Getting rid of those sons of … [who deposed President Zelaya]!” 

This year, Independence Day revealed the deep divisions in Honduran society following the coup. Now, with President Manuel Zelaya having sneaked across the border and camped out at the Brazilian embassy, these divisions are enflaming again today on the streets of Tegucigalpa. For many years, Honduras was Central America’s most politically stable nation outside of Costa Rica; now, it has become polarized.

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Hunger in Guatemala: The Other Story in Central America

September 16, 2009

Journalists and bloggers, including myself, have been focusing their Central American news coverage on the Honduran political crisis.  But, over the last month, it’s become clear that another crisis is unfolding just next door in Guatemala.  Drought has hit the rural areas, and hundreds of people have already died in a country plagued by chronic malnutrition.  Initially, this crisis hit Guatemala’s “dry corridor,” but it has now affected at least six other departments in the western part of the country, where the concentration of indigenous people is higher.

President Álvaro Colom has declared the crisis a “public calamity,” and, if Congress approves this classification, it will hasten the flow of international aid and speed up domestic budget allocations.  No doubt, we must all hope that the government and the international community can act swiftly to prevent this crisis from getting further out of control.  But we must also hope that the Guatemalan government will see this as a symptom of deeper problems—namely, that land tenure remains vastly unequal, and the country’s ability to feed itself has declined in recent years.

Recent reports have made note of Guatemala’s chronic malnutrition—49 percent of children and 60 percent of indigenous children under five years old are malnourished. But the missing link is the connection with inequality in land tenure and food insecurity.  Land has been the most contentious issue in Guatemala since the colonial period, and dispossession and forced labor for coffee plantations were a pervasive fact of life for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Land remained a central issue in the civil war and the peace accords signed in 1996, which included pledges to provide land to impoverished—and especially indigenous—peasants.

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From Tegucigalpa. Tense Stand-Off in the Run-up to Honduran Elections

September 9, 2009

Three months before Honduras’ scheduled elections, tensions remain high in Tegucigalpa.  Walls and campaign propaganda are covered with pro-Zelaya graffiti; explosives have destroyed several fast food establishments and targeted certain media outlets; and a bomb scare took place near the airport this week.  The military remains positioned at strategic locations in the city, closing streets without prior notice.  While most people’s lives have returned to relative normalcy, groups supporting President Manuel Zelaya and de facto President Roberto Micheletti take to the streets daily.  Schools remain closed from Monday through Wednesday each week, as the teachers unions have allied with other organizations to confront the de facto government.   

Despite these disruptions to daily life, leaders of both major parties support the de facto government, and no governmental institution supports Zelaya’s return.  In Tegucigalpa, most people seem to think that Zelaya’s return is impossible and that elections in November are the only way to end this relajo—the mess that has consumed the country since the end of June. 

But the elections may not resolve this crisis.  On the one hand, supporters of Micheletti’s government note that the elections were organized before the coup—with the candidates, chief among them Elvin Santos (Liberal Party, victor in last year’s primary against Micheletti) and Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo (National Party, loser by a slim margin to Zelaya in 2005)—already determined.  They add that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal remains independent of the Executive, so the elections will still be free and fair.  On the other hand, the Organization of American States (OAS) will likely vote this week—after further sanctions from the United States and Mexico, among others—to declare that the elections will be illegitimate unless they are preceded by Zelaya’s return. 

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