Policy Updates

But while transportation planners increasingly look to BRT to reduce congestion, pollution and road fatalities at a time of reduced city budgets, its implementation in Latin American cities has not been without difficulties.

A Magic Bullet?

The main driver of BRT is its low price tag. Capital costs range from one-tenth to one-third of comparable rail systems. Systems also can be implemented in a short timeframe. For example, Macrobús in Guadalajara, Mexico, began operations in March 2009—just two years after the idea was proposed. Such quick turnaround makes these systems an attractive option for city mayors wishing to show results before the next election.

Across the region, BRT systems also get high marks for their performance. Bogotá moves 45,000 passengers per hour per direction at a speed of 16 miles (26 kilometers) per hour. Guayaquil boasts more than 13 passengers boarding its Metrovía buses per kilometer driven, and in Mexico City, 3,000 passengers ride each bus on an average day. High performance brings low operational costs.

BRTs also save time, emissions and accidents. For instance, with the implementation of TransMilenio, Bogotá enjoys an average commuter time savings of 31 percent. Add to that the 302,000-ton reduction in carbon dioxide per year and the 16 lives saved and 260 injuries prevented from road accidents. Similar results have been reported in other BRTs.

As the concept advances, interesting trends are emerging. BRTs can increasingly count on integrated citywide bus systems, improved processes for private-sector participation in operations, increased funding from national governments, and a rise in the number of bus manufacturers and technology providers. These changes are already being seen in countries like Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico.

New information systems that enhance bus quality and performance are also coming on line. For instance, passengers using select BRT systems are now able to plan their route online and to receive real-time information about bus arrivals on their cell phones. At the same time, global positioning systems and advanced control systems are improving system reliability.

But challenges remain for BRT implementation.

First, there is the political hurdle. A mayor needs to be firmly committed to the concept. Inevitably, detractors and opponents—some of them quite powerful politically and economically, such as private bus operators and car users—will emerge. In Quito, Santiago and Bogotá, private bus owners and operators—afraid they would be pushed out of their routes by the new systems—staged protests against the local BRT.

Bogotá car owners—organized by community and business groups—blocked the dedicated bus lanes in the Carrera Séptima BRT corridor to protest the reduction in traffic lanes available for private use. In every case, strong leadership in the mayor’s office and special provisions that allowed existing groups to be part of the new programs preempted opposition.

The second difficulty is institutional, both in the public and private sectors. The public sector needs to develop new institutions and attract a labor force to manage and work on these relatively complicated and technical systems. For its part, the private sector must develop formal companies with the capacity to retain and train drivers, mechanics and operational personnel.

Finally, cities need to find new revenue sources to support construction and maintenance of BRT infrastructure, such as transfers from state or national governments,  new taxes, bonds or privatizations.

One key decision remains: should  governments provide subsidies for students, the elderly and the poor so that they can use the more expensive BRT system? Santiago and São Paulo subsidize public transportation riders, including those who use the BRT. In Quito and Guayaquil the system offers discounted fares for students, elderly and the handicapped, using the revenue from their overall fare collections.

But subsidies largely remain out of the question, since systems typically operate on tight budgets that rely on the revenues generated by user fares.

Other issues seen in BRT systems across Latin America and other developing countries include lack of maintenance, insufficient user education, low quality of service, high occupancy levels, and safety and security concerns. These issues are mostly the result of institutional and financial constraints and are not intrinsic to the BRT concept.

But still, overcoming these issues is critical for the future of BRT systems and will only come with political leadership, adequate funding levels and good planning and management.

A Promising Future

BRT operations will continue to grow, with innovation and adaptation of existing models in cities around the world. But progressive policies and greater knowledge sharing are still needed to address present and future challenges.

One initiative, the Asociación Latinoamericana de Sistemas Integrados y BRT (SIBRT) established in 2010, provides a forum for agencies to share experiences on how to foster BRT system development. In addition, the Center of Excellence in BRT, a research institution established in Chile in 2010, seeks to advance best practices in BRT design and implementation.

These types of new forums offer an important space to address critical issues, such as high occupancy levels, which must be resolved for the BRT model to become an increasingly important transit alternative in a budget-constrained environment.

Urban areas must find new solutions to traffic. With the right tweaks to its BRT systems, Latin America can be a model for transportation planners.

Yet the rural, 1,349-person community of Fond St. Jacques—high in the hills of the larger agricultural community of Soufrière and more than an hour from Castries—was able to minimize the humanitarian impact of the disaster. A massive mudslide had taken four lives and left hundreds without a roof over their heads, and aid agencies were at least 48 hours away from bringing in vital relief supplies. After Hurricane Abby (1960) and Tropical Storm Debby (1994), Fond St. Jacques had also been left isolated—forced to cope with losses of life, livelihoods and homes without supplies or an organized community response team. The difference in the aftermath of Tomas was that hours after the disaster, the community had already initiated its own response.

Members of a community response team—formed and trained in 2009 as part of the American Red Cross/St. Lucia Red Cross’ Readiness to Respond project—swung into action.  Immediately after the hurricane passed, team members left their homes and did what they could to assist neighbors and account for the missing. They journeyed through dangerous terrain to reach their team’s established central meeting point, the credit union.  There they had pre-positioned relief and rescue equipment.  Based on an already-established plan, the team then coordinated relief responsibilities.

One team member worked in the initial hours and days to traverse much of the damaged territory, making assessments and identifying individuals who were severely affected. With the help of others, he secured multiple rope lines across a river running through Fond St. Jacques to evacuate persons in vulnerable situations and to afford other community members a safe passageway.  Two other community response team members initiated a slow journey down to Soufrière to notify government authorities of deaths and damage, while others performed search and rescue efforts that moved the elderly to safety on makeshift stretchers. The team leader managed a shelter in the local church that housed at least 300 displaced people.

This response was possible due to the disaster preparedness of the community response team—a process that involved training responders in first aid, identifying potential risks and getting community-wide agreement on the steps to be taken to plan and prepare for an eventual disaster. The Fond St. Jacques response team also had developed small-scale disaster mitigation projects and plans that iden-tified evacuation routes and emergency shelters.

The response in Fond St. Jacques shows that community resilience is a simple but highly effective approach to disaster management. Community response teams are cost effective too. The initial training costs about $2,500 per team, but the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, which came up with the original concept, estimates that every dollar spent on preparedness saves $4 in response.

Another highly proven and often simple prevention measure to improve resiliency in hazard-prone areas is building effective early warning systems. These relatively simple, low-cost systems—based on person-to-person networks rather than technology—allow messages to reach the most vulnerable who are without access to TV or radio. Increasingly, governments and agencies working in disaster preparedness are recognizing the importance of quickly getting information to the local level.

Community members are first responders, and in each village or city, capacity and resources already exist to help in the event of disaster. This means that the key approach to disaster preparedness is to engage in dialogue, enabling people to understand the risks of potential disasters. At the same time, people must be empowered to plan and organize so that they can save lives and protect households when disaster does strike. Enabling communities to independently handle the immediate effects, especially where governments lack the structure and resources to provide support, is critical.

Fond St. Jacques is not unique. Two other examples from the 2010 hurricane season in the Caribbean stand out for their effective use of community teams: the response to floods in the Dennery community in St. Lucia and the response to a flash flood in Bendals, Antigua.

While effective community-based preparedness and prevention efforts pay off, many hazards exceed the community’s response capacity. This makes it critical to establish partnerships with national disaster agencies and local authorities. In the case of Fond St. Jacques, when NEMO reached the community, an initial on-the-ground assessment already had been conducted and first-hand information provided to the national emergency organization.

In many at-risk communities, local teams respond to disasters without guidance, training, equipment, or a relationship with government disaster agencies. This is a challenge for long-term recovery. But what is encouraging is that community-based disaster management increases local capacity to independently address small disasters: a strategy that saves lives while building bridges between first responders and national authorities.

In fact, according to Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento, the crop forecasting agency owned by the Ministry of Agriculture, the amount of arable land rose from 93.4 million acres (37.8 million hectares) in the 1999–2000 season to 117.1 million acres (47.4 million hectares) in 2009–2010. This 26 percent increase in land used for grain production is complemented by a 40 percent rise in productivity in these areas, resulting in a nearly 64 million ton spike (to 146.9 million tons) in harvest yields over the 10-year period. So while Brazil’s population rose 14 percent over the decade (to 192 million people in 2010), its grain production jumped by 77 percent.

The result is an increase in agricultural potential that outweighs the demands of the domestic population. Add to the mix an expansion in available land and productivity, and signs point to further participation in the agricultural trade.

Export numbers tell the story. Between 1999, when agricultural exports reached approximately $14.1 billion, and 2009, their value soared to more than $54.8 billion. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the value of Brazil’s agriculture exports to the EU rose by 74 percent (to $15.7 billion total) and by 337 percent to China (to $7.4 billion) between 2003 and 2009. As of February 2011, China-destined agriculture exports had jumped another $3.7 billion to $11.1 billion.

Investments in productivity helped drive the export boom. For example, soybean productivity is now about three tons per hectare—a number on par with world leaders—with technology based on genetic modification accounting for more than 60 percent of production. For corn, the average productivity is still relatively low (1.9 tons/acre or 4.3 tons/hectare), because production is scattered across regions and wide variations exist in the size of producers and technology available to them. Another challenge facing corn exporters is the seasonal nature of the crop: the harvest is traditionally subject to inclement weather conditions.

The critical question is whether these achievements are sustainable.

Looking purely at economic fundamentals, Brazil is poised to reap a greater share of the world food trade. It is one of the few countries that—despite enormous progress—still has a large, under-utilized agricultural area. These areas could be tapped for food production after a relatively low-cost investment in soil improvement and fertilization.  Best of all, it could be done without adding further pressure to environmentally sensitive ecosystems. That said, converting land to agricultural use always becomes a political discussion, as farmers, environmentalists and other interests discuss the relative economic benefits and the ecological costs.

But there are still challenges.  Tapping Brazil’s substantial agricultural potential also means modernizing logistics and transportation, and addressing the burdensome and conflicting regulations and policies for infrastructure investment. The Brazilian model, based on government control, is inefficient and cannot keep pace with private sector demands. Legislation to facilitate and encourage private-sector investment in the construction and administration of roads, ports and airports is crucial. For example, 60 percent of agricultural production is transported by truck, but only 10 percent of roads are paved. If infrastructure upgrades do not occur immediately, with projects often taking years to complete, the agricultural sector will stagnate or decline.

Further, the public sector must recognize its vital role in making this happen. Institutions at both a federal and state level need to provide greater investment security, either from the contractual point of view—meaning no changes in the rules of the game—or in terms of property rights guarantees.

Political attention and public-private efforts can help to solidify Brazil’s position as a global agricultural supplier. The potential is certainly there; the next few years will show whether the will is there as well.